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How Losers Can Turn into Winners in Disputatious Public Policy: A Heuristic 
for Prospective Herestheticians 
 
ABSTRACT 
The study of heresthetic is a quest to explain how potential political losers might 
become winners. Local Government amalgamation is invariably a controversial and 
hotly contested political decision. It thus represents the ideal context to locate a 
pedagogical discussion regarding how clever herestheticians might act to bring 
about unlikely political success. Specifically, we extend the heresthetic literature by 
drawing attention to the costs (opportunity, contingency and legacy costs) inherent 
to various strategies, the need to carefully evaluate the heresthetic potential of 
different dimensions according to which amalgamations might be argued, and the 
importance of ensuring that the rhetorical seasoning is appropriate. This leads us to 
propose a heuristic that we argue has the potential to turn losers into winners on the 
vexed matter of local government amalgamations. We conclude by considering the 
implications of our heuristic for both prospective herestheticians in other public 
policy areas and for the wider heresthetic research agenda. 
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Heresthetic is the art of exploiting latent attitudes of an audience in such a way that 
potential losers might become winners (Riker 1986). It differs fundamentally from 
rhetoric which is ‘the faculty of defining in any given case the available means of 
persuasion’ (Aristotle 2012, 8). That is, the heresthetician manipulates along existing 
tastes and preferences – often by re-casting the debate in terms of alternate salient 
dimensions – rather than trying to change tastes and preferences. Indeed, the 
etymology of Riker’s (1986; 1996) neologism is most instructive: Heresthetic is 
derived from the classical Greek haireomai which means ‘to choose…a self-willed 
opinion…which is substituted for the submission to the power of truth, and leads to 
division and formation of sects’ (Vine 1940). The root word is recognisable in our 
English term ‘heresy’ which likewise denotes an opinion contrary to that which is 
commonly held. Thus, a person practising heresthetic seeks to struggle against a 
widely held position by dividing and forming sects out of what might otherwise be a 
dominant and homogenous group. 
Like all arts, heresthetic requires practice in order for one to become a ‘master’. 
Therefore, the ‘vicarious experience of instruction’ takes on particular importance 
for the aspiring heresthetician (Riker 1986, ix). This pedagogical endeavour 
generally starts by identifying a surprising political result, then using this context to 
explicate on the strategic contribution of the heresthetician (McLean 2002).The 
public policy we have chosen to analyse is local government amalgamation which is 
a reform ‘almost certain to engender community angst’ and often leads to political 
losses (XXX and YYY 2017a, 37). The main heresthetic manoeuvre we wish to 
demonstrate is manipulation of dimensions (ways of thinking about a political issue 
which tap into discrete preferences and tastes). To do so, we focus on two of the 
principal dimensions by which local government amalgamation have been ‘sold’1: 
Efficiency (which is defined by economists as the ratio of inputs to outputs and is 
often raised as a means to attaining an end of greater financial sustainability) and 
scale (often promoted in terms of size dependent attributes, such as a local 
government’s capacity to undertake delivery of major infrastructure and regional 
planning, ability to partner and advocate with higher tiers of government, 
strengthening of regional identities and depth of resources to cope with unexpected 
shocks). We contend that the former concept is empirically contestable (that is, open 
to rhetorical challenge) and amenable to precise definition, whilst the latter largely 
defies empirical challenge. This has important implications for the heresthetician 
who must struggle against what appears to be, in many countries, a dominant 
preference against the proposition of local government amalgamation (YYY and 
XXX 2017). To achieve this goal, the heresthetician must divide what is prima facie 
a homogenous group of amalgamation sceptics by introducing new dimensions 
which speak to latent attitudes and tastes (Riker 1986).  
We also innovate by developing a heuristic which might guide the decision making 
of prospective heresthetician seeking to manipulate on dimensions. In particular, the 
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opportunity, contingency and legacy costs) faced by herestheticians and opponents. 
The resultant ‘dimension heuristic’ is consistent with our pedagogical intent and the 
broader aim of the heresthetic research program to ‘supply valid and reliable tools’ 
(Rosenthal 2014, 176). That is, the purpose of our work is to demonstrate what could 
be done in order to enhance the chances of success for future proponents of local 
government amalgamations, not merely to dissect historical events. In this regard, it 
is important to note that one of the big challenges facing any proponent of local 
government amalgamations is that the ‘winners’ from this public policy struggle are 
likely to experience very small gains which are dispersed among many, whilst the 
‘losers’ are likely to experience a profound ‘loss’ and are concentrated and thus more 
easily mobilized for advocacy regarding their position. It is therefore imperative for 
architects of local government amalgamations, in particular, to have a good 
understanding of heresthetic if they are to stand any chance of successfully ‘selling’ 
the said reforms. 
The balance of this journal article is organised as follows. First we extend the 
heresthetic literature by exploring how heresthetic and rhetoric are connected, the 
costs associated with particular decisions, and the importance of considering 
potential opposition responses in the strategic decision-making process. Next we 
review the dimensions of ‘efficiency’ and ‘scale’ with a view to emphasizing the 
utility of each for a heresthetician seeking to win in a struggle for amalgamation. We 
then compare and contrast the two most recent forced amalgamation programmes in 
Australia in order to demonstrate the utility of the heuristic developed from theory. 
We conclude by considering the implications of our heuristic for both prospective 
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2. A Heuristic for Winning 
It is important to note early on that heresthetic is about rational choice, not moral 
choice. Unlike it’s cousin rhetoric, heresthetic does not rely on the ethos – indeed, 
Riker notes that devious means will sometimes be employed in order to execute a 
win but observes that ‘however, much some may condemn the….. heresthetic, 
extraordinary cleverness deserves some reward’ (Riker 1986, 76). Unencumbered by 
any pretence at teaching or exhibiting virtue the heresthetician has a range of 
manipulations at their disposal, which Riker (1986) organises according to three 
categories: Agenda control, strategic voting, and dimension control. We agree with 
McLean (2002, 555) that ‘historians, politicians and political scientists have always 
known that log-rolling and agenda manipulation go on’, thus suggesting that the 
third category – dimension manipulation – might prove to be the most interesting 
and most fruitful avenue for pedagogical purposes. Indeed, Nagel (1993, 157) notes 
that ‘the preferred, most frequently attempted heresthetical device is manipulation of 
dimensions, by which he [Riker] usually means the introduction of a new dimension 
in order to upset the equilibrium’. 
A dimension is a discrete way of looking at a particular matter. For instance, Feiock 
et al. (2006, 275) discuss dimension control relating to local government 
amalgamation, noting instances of debates framed in terms of ‘vague notions of 
economy and efficiency’, racial divisions (and the voice of minority groups), and 
economic development (notably Feiock et al. 2006 do not refer to financial 
sustainability at all in their seminal analysis, presumably because financial 
sustainability is a desired end, not a means to an end). Each dimension is likely to 
resonate with different groups: Efficiency might prove popular with local 
government taxpayers who struggle to pay imposts, minority voice dimensions will 
appeal to minorities and many on the political left, whilst economic development 
will hold particular interest for business owners and perhaps the unemployed. The 
‘art’ in heresthetic is to probe for a dimension that resonates with a sufficient number 
of auditors such that the heresthetician might be in a position to realise a win. 
Heresthetic and Rhetoric 
Both heresthetic and its classical cousin – rhetoric – are concerned with winning. 
However, the win is brought about in fundamentally different ways. The rhetorician 
employs the logos (reasoning to prove a truth or apparent truth), pathos (emotions of 
the listeners) and ethos (the character or portrayed character of the rhetor) to 
persuade auditors (Aristotle 2012). This is a costly and risky endeavour because it 
‘implicitly at least, requires recognition of error’ by the auditor (Riker 1990, 54). 
Indeed, to overcome the natural reticence that most of us feel against admitting that 
we might have erred, rhetors tend to make exaggerated claims of impending doom – 
and there is a growing body of evidence that such claims can be largely categorized 
according to a handful of theses (see, for instance, Hirschman 1991; XXX et al. 
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to Imminent Danger (emphasizing the dangers of passivity in the face of looming 
threats) and Desperate Predicament (a situation so dire as to justify casting caution to 
the wind) arguments (XXX et al. 2016). By way of contrast doom-like theses of 
Jeopardy (an argument of unacceptable consequences) and Perversity (a claim that 
the public policy will produce effects opposite of those which are intended) are 
common rhetorical ploys of those opposed to disputatious public policy reforms 
(YYY and XXX 2017). 
Heresthetic on the other hand, takes existing preferences as fixed and instead focuses 
on tapping into latent attitudes, which may accord with the heresthetician’s goals. 
However, heresthetic is rarely entirely divorced from rhetoric: Indeed, rhetoric is 
often required as a seasoning to make the heresthetic ‘palatable’ (Riker 1990, 48). 
Moreover, because heresthetic does not require auditors to change their opinion it 
can sometimes be a far more cost-effective way of achieving a win.  
Costs 
When considering the costs of winning one must go beyond the actual effort and 
time spent and also consider opportunity costs – the value of alternatives foregone. 
This is particularly important because of the observation that ‘ordinarily a single 
human being can simultaneously only evaluate a few issues and alternatives’ (Riker 
1996, 129) – an idea confirmed by educational psychology. Thus, when one 
dimension is raised it may well prevent the use of other dimensions, or have an 
impact on the effectiveness of other dimensions. Moreover, when effort is expended 
in a rhetorical play, to persuade on a given dimension, it would seem to prohibit (or 
at least make less effective) simultaneous efforts to introduce a new dimension.  
The implication for those seeking to turn a likely loss into a win is that there are 
constraints imposed by opportunity costs which auger against ‘continually poking 
and pushing the world to get the results they want’ (Riker in Shepsle 2003, 310). 
Moreover, it seems to suggest that if a dimension fails to resonate, then the 
heresthetician might be well advised to quickly discard said dimension in favour of a 
new approach (in order to avoid exceeding auditor capacity to simultaneously 
evaluate alternatives), or probe for a complementary dimension (that is consistent 
with the previous dimension and therefore sums to the adherents which the 
heresthetician is able to prise off from the dominant sect).  
The recognition of the salience of opportunity cost seems to suggest that it is 
important for the putative loser to know in advance how they might achieve a win. 
This appears prima facie to be an extraordinary conundrum – to know in advance the 
result arising from a heresthetic probe or rhetorical ploy would seem to require not 
only the ability to predict the future of one’s own actions, but also the retaliatory 
actions of one’s opponents. However, there are some measures which might be taken 
to allow the prospective heresthetician to gauge the likely response of auditors and 
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past games have been played – particularly, where games have been played multiple 
times – and there is a relatively large heresthetic literature employing analytical 
narratives to dissect such ‘historical’ surprising results (although little in the context 
of local government amalgamations; see, for instance, Feiock et al. 2006; Riker 
19862). Secondly, there is the option of employing a focus group to ‘pre-test’ a 
heresthetic and the rhetorical seasoning employed to make it palatable. Indeed, Riker 
(1986) saw the advent of the focus group to be an innovation of great potential for 
the heresthetician. 
It should also be noted that costs have a temporal dimension: That is, in addition to 
the immediate cost, there may well be a cost incurred down the track. For example, if 
claims are made in prosecuting a win that could be tested against evidence after the 
public policy has been implemented, then this represents a contingency cost (which 
can be defined as costs which only emerge should future events occur). Moreover, 
the potential for a win to subsequently be reversed, may represent a potential legacy 
cost (which can be defined as costs which are incurred only when political decisions 
are subsequently reversed). Both contingency and legacy costs have been largely 
neglected in the heresthetic literature and correcting this neglect suggests that vision 
might also be required – not only to set about the activities needed to turn a potential 
loss into a win in the present, but to also incorporate measures to reduce costs into 
the future (see, Rosenthal and Doron 2009 for an example of the intertemporal 
dependency of heresthetic). One way of containing temporal costs is to lock-in a win 
by executing an irreversible decision – such an act, where it is possible, not only 
thwarts opponents during the public policy battle, but also protects the legacy of the 
heresthetician after the victory (Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2012). 
However, it would be quite wrong to perceive that costs only introduce constraints 
onto the heresthetician – opposing a heresthetical manoeuvre also requires opponents 
to spend time and effort, and forego other alternatives. The clever heresthetician can 
use this knowledge to their advantage in a number of ways. For instance, the 
heresthetician can choose dimensions that practically constrain the feasible options 
of their opponents by raising a dimension that accords with the opponent’s ideology 
or that pre-empts a likely rhetorical foil (Riker 1990). Second, the heresthetician can 
introduce a dimension through an expert independent ‘friend’ – or multiple expert 
friends – that increases the rhetorical cost of opposing the dimension (XXX and 
YYY 2017). This would seem to be an important improvement to the independent 
neutral friend of Riker’s (1986) camouflaged gerrymander heresthetic. Third, it 
might also be possible to fix the number of dimensions (Dellepiane-Avellaneda 
2012) – by arguing from the outset that only one dimension is salient, dismissing 
attempts to introduce new dimensions as political games, or setting in place a 
constrained institutional instrument (for instance a Boundaries Commission with 
restrictive Terms of Reference) for deliberating on a public policy proposal – thus 




  Page 7 
Combining these insights yields a heuristic for prospective herestheticians seeking to 
engineer a political surprise, thus:  
[Please insert Figure 1 here] 
As illustrated in Figure 1 prior to realising a surprising win on public policy a good 
deal of preparation is indicated for our prospective heresthetician. First, it seems 
important to take full advantage of vicarious instruction by reviewing how the game 
has been played in the past through the lens of heresthetic theory – this ‘homework’ 
has the potential to reduce opportunity costs for the proponent. Second, the choice of 
dimension needs to be made with a view to increasing the opportunity costs for 
opponents. Third, the heresthetic (and its accompanying rhetorical seasoning) must 
be prepared and ideally tested. This component of the preparation includes 
conducting sophisticated empirical proof (where relevant) and ensuring that 
independent expert friends are on-hand to improve the palatability of the heresthetic 
dimension. This third component of the heuristic, if done well, will minimise both 
opportunity costs (getting the seasoning right means the dimension is more likely to 
succeed) and limit contingency costs (for example, ensuring the evidence is robust 
leaves little room for analysis that might support contrary positions). Only after this 
homework has been thoroughly completed should the dimension be launched and the 
heuristic notes that efforts should be made to fix dimensionality from the outset in 
order to constrain opponent heresthetic options and hence reduce potential 
contingency cost (and perhaps also push opponents towards the relatively more 
costly option of rhetoric). Finally, our heuristic makes plain the importance of 
locking-in the win as quickly as possible in an irreversible fashion to insure against 
legacy costs (this might be achieved by forming new local government areas from 
parts of former councils thus making it ‘nigh on impossible to unscramble the egg’ 
(YYY and XXX (2017b, 375)). 
 
We now examine in greater depth two dimensions which are commonly employed as 
the moving force to sell amalgamation, in order to highlight our observation that all 
dimensions are not created equal, before applying our heuristic to a comparative 
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3. Two Dimensions of Local Government Amalgamation Debate: 
Efficiency, and Scale. 
There are two dimensions which are commonly appealed to by herestheticians to 
‘sell’ local government amalgamation. The first, and most common, dimension is 
efficiency: Specifically the assertion that larger councils can capture economies of 
scale and thus reduce the unit cost of providing services. Efficiency is generally 
presented as the means to achieving the teleological end of improved financial 
sustainability. The second dimension – which has appeared more recently in debates 
on local government amalgamation in the Antipodes – is an argument that greater 
scale leads to stronger councils with qualitative benefits including inter alia better 
regional planning, ability to attract more qualified staff, superior political leadership, 
and enhanced ability to partner with higher tiers of government (XXX and ZZZ 
2016). This second dimension is generally not argued for in terms of the end of 
financial sustainability probably because there is no systemic evidence that scale 
alone is associated with financial sustainability (see, XXX and ZZZ 2014). We have 
chosen these two dimensions because they were appealed to more frequently than 
any other by amalgamation proponents in recent debates (for instance, both 
efficiency and scale were the dominant themes in the NSW Government (2015) 
publication used to launch the forced amalgamation and ‘stronger and more efficient 
councils’ were cited in the short media release proclaiming the new local 
government entities; Baird 2016). Moreover, we reflect on the heresthetic utility of 
each dimension, before briefly examining how the dimensions were employed in the 
recent contentious forced amalgamations in New South Wales (NSW) and 
Queensland. 
Selling the Efficiency Dimension 
Technical efficiency is precisely defined by economists to be the ratio of inputs to 
outputs (after Farrell 1957) but is commonly employed in an imprecise ‘cost savings’ 
sense (Faulk et al. 2013). Moreover, it is often taken for granted that ‘efficiency’ is 
ipso facto good thus Reinhardt (1992, 3) states that ‘the fastest way to eliminate a 
rival policy is simply to brand it inefficient’. Efficiency sans deliberative 
interrogation probably does resonate strongly with communities – it is certainly the 
case that few citizens would advocate for inefficient government, not least because 
this would suggest upward pressure on local government taxation imposts. Yet it is 
also clear that efficiency is not in any sense the raison d’etre for government – there 
are many competing aspects of government which one might well value more 
strongly, such as equity, responsiveness, due process, and democratic accountability 
(Goodin and Wilenski 1984). Indeed, the presence of competing and compelling 
values underscores the lessons from the heresthetic literature with respect to the need 
to fix the dimensionality quickly if it resonates strongly. 
The fact that efficiency can be precisely defined and measured means that it is 
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depends largely on how the proponent heresthetician introduces the dimension. For 
instance, if the efficiency dimension is introduced as merely a claim, without 
empirical evidence, then opposing parties might be able to simply dismiss the claim 
of efficiency out of hand (in which case persuasion will largely rely on the ethos). 
Opponents would, of course, be free to introduce empirical evidence to support their 
argument (and most people’s propensity to put greater store in empirical evidence 
may mean that evidence-based rhetorical challenges will be more likely to succeed 
(McCloskey, 1998)), but they are not forced to do so. However, if the proponent 
heresthetician leads with empirical evidence then it would seem that opponents 
would be generally forced to counter with their own empirical facts (to overcome the 
imposing rhetorical challenge of convincing people that they might have erred in 
their earlier acceptance of evidence-based claims it would seem important to offer 
compelling empirical evidence, see XXX et al. 2016). 
Because claims of efficiency made with empirical proof largely dictate empirical 
refutation the clever heresthetician can increase the opportunity costs for opponent 
rhetoricians by ensuring that the dimension is introduced by expert friends 
employing sophisticated modelling that uses long panels of data. To persuade against 
amalgamation in the face of this kind of evidence requires opponents to make both a 
compelling argument for why the expert friend ethos should be disregarded, and 
introduces significant information costs (arising from the need to collect the data and 
conduct the analysis; see, XXX et al. 2016). 
The fact that efficiency claims can be tested empirically also exposes the proponent 
heresthetician to potential legacy risk. This is because efficiency, amenable to 
precise economic definition and estimation, can be calculated ex post to assess 
proponent claims. Once again, it is important to increase the cost of refutation – this 
can be achieved by extending the projected horizon used to make efficiency claims. 
For instance, rather than making a generic claim of increased efficiency, one can 
make a time-specific claim of an efficiency saving (perhaps over ten years or more). 
Such a claim will, at least, delay refutation and avoid same entirely if the opposition 
is unable to maintain its ardour over such a lengthy period. Another way of 
protecting legacy is to suggest that the efficiency savings might be re-invested into 
better quality assets or services or downward pressure on local government taxation. 
These claims would be almost impossible to refute because sufficiently detailed 
financial data is rarely available. However, claims of re-invested efficiency savings 
do run the risk of drawing attention to the fact that efficiency is little more than a 
way of exchanging one set of wants for another, and the heresthetician will need to 
judge whether the risk associated with this rhetorical seasoning is worth the potential 
mitigation of legacy costs (Goodin and Wilenski 1984) 
Selling the Scale Dimension 
Scale can be defined in terms of population size, number of assessable properties, 
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discussed (instead of being defined) in terms of qualities attributed to scale (such as 
strength, capacity to undertake regional planning and regional advocacy, ability to 
partner with higher tiers of government, ability to attract more qualified staff and 
better political representatives) (ILGRP 2013). In many respects the scale dimension 
can be boiled downed to an assertion that ‘bigger is better’ (YYY and XXX 2017) 
and this assertion is likely to resonate strongly given that it is implicitly reinforced 
every time one is offered the opportunity to ‘upsize’ one’s burger meal or mobile 
phone plan – or, one’s local government. Indeed, the frequency with which 
marketing agencies appeal to the ‘bigger is better’ concept is strong evidence of its 
perceived efficacy (Riker, 1990). Moreover, there is a good deal of evidence to 
suggest that the bigger is better dictum does resonate strongly in local government 
amalgamation debates (see, for example, Savitch et al. 2010). 
The scale dimension also introduces constraints onto opponent herestheticians. For 
instance, the scale argument may neutralize much of the opponent ‘identity’ 
dimension: More often than not individuals work, shop and live in multiple local 
government areas – if pressed to assert an identity, (for instance when asked where 
they live by a person from overseas), said individuals may nominate the larger 
regional identity (for example, ‘Sydney’), rather than the specific local government 
area (perhaps ‘Randwick’). Thus, when scale is associated with the functional area in 
which the individual actually operates, the concordance may resonate strongly and 
make the identity dimension seem incongruous and thus practically constrain the 
feasible set of dimensions open to opposing herestheticians. Scale arguments can 
also be framed in terms of internalising spill-overs – which is an inherently 
appealing concept on equity grounds – and thus thwart another potential opposition 
heresthetic (equity). This suggests that the rhetorical seasoning accompanying the 
scale dimension might emphasise functional identity and by so doing, it might be 
possible to practically constrain opposition options.  
It also seems to be the case that the scale argument – because of the multiple ways in 
which size can be conceived to improve outcomes – can be ‘sold’ by multiple 
‘friends’. For instance, property developer lobbies can point to more affordable 
housing that might result from streamlined development planning rules; examples of 
major regional infrastructure brought to fruition by previously amalgamated large 
regional local governments can be used as ‘proof’ that scale matters; and, politicians 
and bureaucrats from previously amalgamated councils may be pressed in to service 
to reflect upon the higher calibre of individuals which the larger entity has been able 
to attract (it would seem that they would have a vested interest in promulgating this 
claim).  
As we have noted, the heresthetician employing scale to sell local government 
amalgamations is immune from the risk of empirical refutation – the fact that 
amalgamation will increase scale is beyond dispute. This fact also means that there 
are relatively few contingency costs associated with the dimension and limited risks 
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opens the heresthetician up to the risk that auditors will be incapable of 
simultaneously evaluating all the arguments, and therefore dismiss it as background 
noise. Herestheticians might therefore be well advised to limit the number issues that 
they raise in relation to this dimension to ensure that the inherent appeal of bigger is 
better isn’t lost in a flurry of reasons for why it might so (recalling the lessons from 
educational psychology regarding the capacity of the human mind). 
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
In sum, the contrast between efficiency and scale demonstrates that all dimensions 
are far from created equal when viewed from the prospective of a heresthetician 
seeking to engineer a win on the matter of local government amalgamation. We now 
briefly examine how these dimensions were employed through the lens of our 
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4. Efficiency and Scale in Australian Forced Amalgamations 
The two most recent forced amalgamation programs (Queensland and New South 
Wales) can give us a good insight into the importance of the various elements of the 
heuristic that we have discussed thus far, for structuring the world in such a way that 
one might win on the vexatious matter of local government amalgamation. Notably, 
neither amalgamation can be considered an unmitigated success, and given 
Australia’s heavy reliance on amalgamation as the principal instrument for 
addressing financial sustainability woes (there are pressures in Tasmania and South 
Australia for further amalgamations and the NSW government continues to avoid 
ruling out future efforts), the pedagogical need for prospective proponents seems 
urgent. Unsuccessful amalgamation programmes subject communities, state and 
local governments to great pecuniary, political and human costs and it is thus 
important to optimise the chances of success once the decision is taken to pursue 
amalgamations. The main players in both programs were essentially the same: 
Proponents of amalgamation were the incumbent state governments, and opponents 
of amalgamation were the local governments (particularly elected representatives 
and executives who stood to lose the most), and the political opposition party who 
were presented with an opportunity to derive political capital from the events. We 
first briefly review how the key elements of our heuristic transpired in Queensland in 
2007, before turning to the NSW case (2012-2016) that might have benefitted from 
‘homework’ derived from the Queensland experience. 
Queensland Forced Amalgamation 
The Queensland amalgamation program formerly commenced with the establishment 
of the Local Government Reform Commission (LGRC), in April 2007, which was a 
nominally independent expert panel (although it included Labor party powerbroker 
Terry Mackenroth who had been the Deputy Premier and Treasurer just two years 
prior for the incumbent government). Just ten weeks after its establishment the 
LGRC (2007, 13) handed down its recommendation to reduce the number of 
councils from 157 to 73, which the incumbent Labor government endorsed ‘lock 
stock and barrel’ (Beattie and Fraser 2007). The final report of the LGRC had a 
relatively large focus on efficiency (as a pathway to financial sustainability) with 32 
mentions of the term compared with just nine references to scale, although no robust 
empirical evidence was tendered in the final LGRC (2007) report for the claim that 
amalgamation would enhance efficiency. The incumbent state government chose to 
emphasise the dimension of scale (and strength attendant on scale) in its media 
release response to the LGRC report, and made no specific mention of efficiency at 
all (Beattie and Fraser 2007). The legislation was passed through Parliament on the 
10th of August, 2007 – less than four months after the commencement of the 
program. All of the proposed amalgamations proceeded as planned. 
Opponents of the amalgamation accused the state government of trashing their 
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intervene (through plebiscites designed to embarrass the state government; Moore 
2007)). In addition the political opposition promised to allow de-amalgamations in 
the event that they were later able to form government – a promise that ultimately 
resulted in four de-amalgamations in January, 2014 (De Souza et al. 2014). Thus, 
whilst proponents were able to execute all of the amalgamations they planned, the 
programme cannot be considered an unmitigated success due to the legacy costs 
borne. 
New South Wales Forced Amalgamation 
The NSW forced amalgamation program can be traced back to May 2012 when the 
Independent Local Government Review Panel (ILGRP) was established. The ILGRP 
undertook extensive consultations and released a number of briefing documents prior 
to its final report which detailed ‘preferred option’ amalgamations in October 2013. 
The ILGRP (2013a) report raised both efficiency and scale dimensions as arguments 
for amalgamation (citing the former 56 times and the latter 17 times). The incumbent 
Liberal National coalition government then commenced a formal process of 
gathering evidence on efficiency (despite the fact that consultation documents 
suggest it initially resonated strongly, ILGRP 2013b), financial sustainability and 
scale in September 2014 – and pursued both dimensions (efficiency and scale) in its 
formal response to the ILGRP report (mentioning efficiency three times and scale 
twice). The evidence gathering process – which first asked councils to self-assess 
according to seven financial ratios (including an efficiency ratio) and an adequate 
scale and capacity criteria, and then engaged expert brands (Ernst & Young and 
KPMG) to redo the work – elicited a Ministerial proposal for forced amalgamations 
in December 2015. This forced amalgamation proposal made seven mentions of 
efficiency (quantifying the projected savings) and four mentions of scale, 
demonstrating that both dimensions were actively pursued by the state government 
proponents of amalgamation. Notably, the media release announcing that twenty out 
of the forty-seven proposals had gone ahead, issued on the 12 of May 2016, made 
just two references to efficiency and no explicit mention of scale. 
Opponents of the amalgamations in NSW accused the state government of trashing 
their democratic rights, threatened litigation, and in some cases pursued litigation. 
Opponents also actively contested empirical claims of efficiency in the media and in 
the Courts (Visentin and Saulwick 2017). The state political opposition made an 
immediate pledge to allow de-amalgamation in the event that they subsequently 
gained office, and have since repeated the pledge a number of times which suggests 
they believe it to be efficacious (McNally 2016). 
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
Comparison of Approaches to Heuristic. 
Neither amalgamation episode can be considered an unmitigated success (although at 
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simply do not have an exemplar of structuring the world so that one can win, and 
keep winning, on the vexatious matter of local government amalgamations. 
However, comparison of the key facts from each case can provide us with some 
assurance as to the validity of the theoretical model that we built earlier.  
A key concept that we extracted from the heresthetic literature relates to the 
importance of doing one’s homework diligently to increase costs for opponents. In 
the case of NSW, the government had a relatively recent example of how the game 
had been played before from which they might have taken some important lessons. 
In particular, the speed with which the Queensland amalgamations had been 
executed, that had been credited with ‘forestall[ing] the mobilisation of effective 
opposition’, was a lesson that might have reduced contingency costs considerably 
had it been heeded in NSW (Dollery et al. 2011, 612). In similar vein, a student of 
previous amalgamations would have been well aware that litigation might be 
threatened, and that state political opposition parties would likely attempt to accrue 
political capital out of events by pledging the opportunity for de-amalgamations in 
the event that they subsequently gained office. Indeed, a pledge of de-amalgamation 
might be considered a near-certain eventuality given that de-amalgamation has no 
pecuniary cost for the state government (local government ratepayers foot the bill) 
and can only serve to garner votes arising from the sustained anger that tends to 
accompany episodes of forced amalgamation (the evidence from the negativity bias 
literature tells us that people are more likely to act on a loss and that grievances 
arising from large losses tend to be sticky, Boydstun et al. 2017). As we have seen, 
failure to do this homework in NSW resulted in significant contingency and likely 
legacy costs being incurred. 
Another important component of a heresthetician’s homework relates to choosing an 
appropriate heresthetic dimension – preferably one that constrains options for 
opponents. Notably in both states, the Panels recommending amalgamations made 
reference to both efficiency and scale in their final reports. Thus state government 
amalgamation proponents could easily have adopted one or both of the dimensions in 
their final pitch to stakeholders. In Queensland the dimension chosen was scale, 
whilst in NSW both scale and efficiency were pursued. As we noted earlier, scale 
defies empirical contestation and can neutralise identity and equity dimensions, 
whilst efficiency claims can be contested although the costs of doing so can be 
amplified by clever herestheticians. Indeed, ensuring that one has sophisticated 
empirical evidence with appropriate rhetorical seasoning is the last part of the 
heresthetician’s homework and it is quite evident that neither group of proponents 
attended to this component. Failure to do this homework in NSW resulted in 
significant opportunity and contingency costs being incurred, but in Queensland 
these potential costs seemed to have been mitigated by the speed of execution. 
Once a heresthetician’s homework has been satisfactorily completed the dimension 
should be launched in a manner that reflects the need to fix dimensionality. In 




  Page 15 
endorsed and executed the amalgamations, in fact, served to fix dimensionality 
(because opponents were simply not given time to garner contrary evidence or fully 
develop new dimensions). By way of contrast, in NSW opponents were provided 
with ample time to develop new dimensions and provide contrary evidence. 
Ironically this time came as a result of the NSW state government’s tortious efforts 
to develop empirical evidence to support the claims of efficiency (firstly through 
local government self-assessments and later through expert brands including Ernst & 
Young and KPMG (see XXX and YYY 2017). In neglecting to do their homework 
before launching the heresthetic dimension, but deciding to complete it as a belated 
afterthought, the NSW amalgamation proponents effectively shifted the burden of 
opportunity cost from their opponents to themselves. Otherwise stated, it was worse 
than providing no empirical evidence at all, because the time taken to belatedly do so 
provided opponents with the opportunity to marshal compelling contrary evidence 
and thus created contingency costs for amalgamation proponents forced to defend 
the evidence (Visentin and Saulwick 2017; Gladstone, 2016). Failure to fix 
dimensionality in NSW opened proponents up to both rhetorical (disputing the 
efficiency claims with alternate expert brands; XXX and YYY 2017) and heresthetic 
reprisals (introducing the legal dimension), resulting in both the failure to increase 
opportunity costs for opponents and the incursion of significant contingency costs. 
The final and crucial step for the heresthetician is to lock-in the win as quickly as 
possible in an irreversible fashion. There is a subtle but important difference between 
structuring the world so that one can win, and actually winning akin to the difference 
between a great schmooze and actually ringing up the sale. As evidenced in these 
case-studies fast execution resulted in all of the proposed amalgamations proceeding, 
whereas long and tortious execution resulted in less than half of the proposals 
proceeding (due to mounting contingency costs which ultimately ended in political 
failure). However, amalgamation proponents in both states failed to protect their 
legacies by ensuring that all of the amalgamations were irreversible. The most 
expedient way to do this is to assemble new local government entities out of parts of 
former councils, thus destroying all hope of returning to former identities. The 
legacy cost of failing to do this in Queensland was four de-amalgamations – in NSW 
it is still too early to assess the final cost but given the pledge of the state political 
opposition it is likely that a legacy cost will be ultimately born. 
We now conclude by considering the implications of our heuristic for both 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
The major contribution of this work is to draw attention to both the importance of 
costs and dimension to prospective herestheticians. Specifically we note the saliency 
of opportunity costs (which can be mitigated by doing ones homework with respect 
to how the game has been played before and preparing proofs and ‘expert friends’ in 
advance), contingency costs (which might be limited by carefully constructing 
evidence and also through fixing the number of dimensions), and legacy costs 
(which can be constrained by locking-in the win in an irreversible fashion). We also 
draw attention to the fact that not all dimensions have the same potential costs and 
opportunities associated with them. In sum, our heuristic emphasises the importance 
of doing one’s homework and considering all dimensions in terms of heresthetic 
potential prior to trying to engineer a surprising political win. 
Most of the principles illustrated in our heuristic and subsequent analysis of the 
NSW and Queensland local government amalgamations would seem to apply equally 
to any field of public policy. For instance, it is almost always the case that the game 
has been played before (in one’s own jurisdiction or in a jurisdiction abroad), that 
there are different dimensions from which the heresthetician might choose (that hold 
different potential costs and benefits) and that the heresthetic can be tested in 
advance through focus groups and the like (which requires one to prepare ones 
‘proof’ and ‘expert friends’ in advance, which in and of itself would be a beneficial 
outcome of applying our heuristic). Thus the importance of what could be classified 
as doing ones homework – the first level of our heuristic – would seem to apply to 
any public policy context (be it local government amalgamation, changes to school 
funding, changes to taxation policy or just about anything else). Similarly the 
desirability of fixing dimensions seems universal, although the number of available 
dimensions would seem to depend on the particular public policy. Only when it 
comes to locking-in the win in an irreversible fashion might the aspiring 
heresthetician be unable to faithfully follow the heuristic (for example funding 
formulas and tax changes can always be reversed), although the desirability of 
protecting legacy means that serious attention should always be given to same. 
One area for future research arising from our work will be to test the rhetorical 
seasoning of multiple brands and empirical evidence on representative samples of 
the community (the apparently neglected focus groups from FFTF). Experimental 
evidence of this kind would allow the heresthetician to better grasp the importance of 
rhetorical seasoning in heresthetic manoeuvres. In similar vein, comparing public 
policy successes and failures in similar institutional milieus offer ‘natural 
experiment-like’ conditions which might cast further light on the relative importance 
of the heresthetic’s presentation to its success. Further work might also look into 
why political actors, in particular, choose rhetorical rather than heresthetic 
approaches – specifically, whether these decisions are contingent on ideology, media 
activity, or practical constraints imposed by proponent herestheticians who have 
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about the conditions which make heresthetic or rhetoric a rational choice still seem 
to be far from determined in the literature. 
In sum, well over three decades on from Riker’s seminal work, there is still much to 
be done before we can fully understand why some public policy sales are surprising 
successes and others predictable (but perhaps avoidable) failures and we thus 
commend this research programme to our peers. 
 
Notes 
1.  We acknowledge that other dimensions exist – however, our concern is with the two dimensions 
most commonly employed to sell amalgamation. The lessons we deduce regarding the factors 
which make one dimension more desirable than another, can be applied beyond the pair of 
exemplars. 
2.   There are countless narratives on local government amalgamation (that employ empirical and other 
frameworks) and prospective herestheticians, having mastered heresthetic concepts, may also be 
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Table 1. Comparison of Efficiency and Scale Dimensions 
Efficiency Scale 
Can be empirically contested. Defies empirical contestation. 
Can introduce constraints onto 
opponents if evidence and expert brands 
employed. 
Inherently constrains identity and equity 
dimensions. 
Can be sold by expert brands. Can be sold by multiple friends, 
including experts. 
Potential contingency and legacy costs 
if claims tested. 
Little potential contingency and legacy 
costs because claims defy testing. 
 
Table 2. Comparative Analysis of Heresthetic Moves in Queensland and New South 
Wales 
 Queensland New South Wales 
Dimension pursued by 
Government 
Scale. Efficiency and scale. 
Rhetorical Seasoning Linking scale to vague 
notions of strength. 
Empirical proof of 
efficiency by self-
assessment and expert 
brands. 
Efforts to fix 
dimensions 
Quick implementation (4 
months) that curtailed 
public debate. 
Little attempt to fix 
dimensions over 4 years. 
Opponent moves Threat of litigation; call for 
plebiscite; promise of de-
amalgamation. 






Locking-in win quickly 
in an irreversible 
fashion 
Less than 4 months, but 
little effort to protect 
against reversal. 
4 years and little effort to 
protect against reversal.  
Success? All proposals executed, but 
four subsequent de-
amalgamations. 
Less than half of the 
proposals executed, and 
de-amalgamation remains 



















Figure 1. A Heresthetic Heuristic for Winning 
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